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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we examine the association between financial reporting quality and acquisition 
profitability in a sample of 282 acquisitions in South Korea between 2001 and 2011. Using the 
accruals quality measure developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and McNichols (2002), we find 
that firms with high-quality financial reporting make more profitable acquisitions, as measured by 
the bidder's announcement returns. In addition, we find that the importance of financial reporting 
quality increases in firms with poor information environments. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
inancial reporting quality has a profound influence on managerial decision-making, particularly in the 
areas of investment. Prior studies suggest that high-quality financial reporting may increase 
investment efficiency (e.g., Bushman and Smith, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Biddle and Hilary, 
2006; Biddle et al., 2009). They posit that the association between financial reporting quality and investment 
efficiency relates to a reduction in information asymmetry between firms and external suppliers of capital because 
transparent accounting reduces both adverse selection and moral hazard. For example, high-quality financial 
reporting may allow constrained firms to attract capital by making their positive net present value (NPV) projects 
more visible to investors and reducing adverse selection in the issuance of securities. In addition, high-quality 
financial reporting may curb managerial incentives to engage in value-destroying activities such as empire building 
in firms with excess capital. High-quality financial reporting improves contracting, prevents inefficient investment, 
and increases investors' ability to monitor managerial investment decisions. 
 
Acquisitions are among the largest and most readily observable forms of corporate investment. Investments 
in this form tend to intensify the conflicts of interest inherent between managers and shareholders in large public 
companies (Berle and Means, 1933; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is also well recognized that managers do not 
always make shareholder value-maximizing acquisitions; instead, they may extract private benefits at the expense of 
shareholders. Jensen (1986) argues that managers pursue perquisite consumption from empire building. He predicts 
that firms with abundant cash flows are more likely to make value-destroying acquisitions rather than excess 
payouts to shareholders.
1
 Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) identify several types of acquisitions that can yield 
substantial benefits to managers at the expense of shareholders. 
 
In this paper, we investigate the effects of high-quality financial reporting on information asymmetry 
between managers and shareholders and on management investment decisions, focusing on acquisition. If 
shareholders could monitor and control the acquisition decisions of managers based on high-quality financial reports, 
acquisitions that reduce shareholder value and increase personal benefits to managers would be disallowed, and 
acquisition investment profitability would be higher. 
                                           
1
 The research of Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) also provides evidence supporting this assertion. 
F 
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We define financial reporting quality as the degree to which financial reporting conveys precise information 
about a firm's operation. We use a measure of accruals quality developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and 
McNichols (2002) as a proxy for financial reporting quality. This measure is based on the idea that accruals have a 
shifting or adjusting effect on the recognition of cash flows over time. Adjusted earnings is a superior measure of 
firm performance that has been used extensively in earlier literature. The use of accruals quality as a measure 
depends on the fact that accruals are assumptions and estimates of future cash flows that are more representative of 
future cash flows when the magnitude of error in estimation of accruals is lower. We define acquisition efficiency 
(profitability) of investment decisions as the acquirer's 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the initial 
acquisition announcement date, following the procedure of Francis and Martin (2010). This definition captures the 
market's expectation of both ex ante investment selection and ex post decision-making. 
 
We study the relation between financial reporting quality and acquisition investment efficiency in a sample 
of 282 completed acquisitions in South Korea provided by S&P Capital IQ, a data supplier, during the sample period 
of 2001 to 2011. We find a positive association between the financial reporting quality of the acquiring firm and 
larger announcement returns. In addition, we find a stronger association between high accounting quality and 
acquisition investment efficiency in a low-quality information environment, as measured by lack of analyst 
following. This result suggests that the importance of financial reporting quality increases in firms with poor 
information environments, and that information environments may be interchangeable with financial reporting 
quality in terms of their association with acquisition profitability. 
 
Our findings contribute to a growing body of literature on the relations between financial reporting quality 
and investment decisions (e.g., Bens and Monahan, 2004; Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Bushman et al., 2006; Betty et 
al., 2008; Beatty et al., 2008; Hope and Thomas, 2008; McNichols and Stubben, 2008; Biddle et al., 2009; Francis 
and Martin, 2010). Our results extend and generalize the results of prior studies by using acquisition profitability as 
a measure of investment efficiency instead of over- or underinvestment, which has been frequently used in earlier 
studies. This relationship between financial reporting quality and acquisition efficiency has seldom been explored in 
prior research.
2
 Our study is also related to those of Chen et al. (2007) and Francis and Martin (2010), who 
document the positive association between monitoring systems and expected acquisition profitability. This 
association is more pronounced for bidders with high ex ante agency costs. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews prior literature and develops our 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and research design. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. RELATED RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 The Effect of Information Asymmetry between Managers and Outside Suppliers of Capital on 
Investment Efficiency 
 
Agency theory describes the natural conflict between managers and shareholders. The conflict arises 
because managers choose actions to maximize their own utility. The conflict is caused by information asymmetry 
between managers and outside suppliers of capital. Information asymmetry between managers and shareholders can 
reduce capital investment efficiency by giving rise to imperfections such as moral hazard and adverse selection. 
 
Moral hazard models suggest that managers will invest in inefficient projects such as negative NPV 
projects when information asymmetry exists between principal and agent. According to Berle and Means (1933) and 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), managers maximize their personal welfare by investing opportunistically at the 
expense of shareholders' interests. Jensen (1986) suggests that managers have incentives to invest beyond their 
optimal size for the purpose of empire building rather than making excess payouts to shareholders. In addition, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) describe the incentive of managers to make manager-specific investments that make it 
                                           
2
 McNichols and Stubben (2011) and Raman, Shivakumar, and Tamayo (2008) also consider accounting quality and acquisitions. These 
studies examine the effects of the target's accounting information quality. However, our paper focuses on the quality of financial 
reporting of acquiring firms rather than that of target firms. 
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costly for shareholders to replace them, allow them to extract higher wages and larger perquisites from shareholders, 
and enable them to obtain more latitude in determining corporate strategy. Models of adverse selection in the 
research of Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that if managers are better informed than investors about a firm's 
prospects, they will try to sell overpriced securities in order to raise capital. If managers are successful, they may 
overinvest these proceeds. However, in response, rational investors will increase the cost of capital, which may lead 
to ex post underinvestment. Therefore, adverse selection also leads to inefficient investment on the part of managers. 
 
2.2 The Effect of Financial Reporting Quality on Investment Efficiency 
 
Monitoring systems are required to mitigate managerial opportunistic investment decision-making under 
conditions of information asymmetry between managers and outside suppliers of capital. Jensen (2000) emphasizes 
the importance of monitoring systems to curb managerial incentives to overinvest, and Watts and Zimmerman (1983, 
1986) and Ball (1989) consider accounting to be a part of the firm's controlling mechanism. In addition, Bushman 
and Smith (2001) present an overview of the large body of literature that describes financial accounting reporting as 
an important source of information used by shareholders and others to monitor managers. Other recent literature 
suggests that financial reporting quality can affect investment efficiency, emphasizing the ability of monitoring to 
mitigate information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. 
 
Biddle and Hilary (2006) examine the relations between accounting quality and firm-level capital 
investment efficiency. They provide evidence that high-quality accounting enhances investment efficiency by 
reducing information asymmetry between managers and outside suppliers of capital. This effect is stronger in 
economies dominated by stock markets than in those dominated by creditors. Biddle et al. (2009) find a positive 
association between high-quality financial reporting and lower overinvestment and underinvestment. They argue 
that better financial reporting can increase capital by reducing adverse selection and creating positive NPV projects. 
Alternatively, better financial reporting can curb managerial incentives to engage in value-destroying activities such 
as empire building in firms with ample capital. It can also enhance investors' ability to monitor managerial 
investment decisions. McNichols and Stubben (2008) document that firms that misrepresent their financial status 
make investments that are substantially larger than optimal size. This finding suggests that financial reporting 
quality can influence internal decision-making. 
 
Hope and Thomas (2008) test the agency cost hypothesis in the context of geographic earnings disclosures. 
They find that because nondisclosure of geographic earnings hinders the ability of shareholders to monitor managers, 
managers are more willing to engage in empire building, despite the fact that it reduces firm value. Francis and 
Martin (2010) investigate the association between timely loss recognition and acquisition investment decisions. 
They predict that accounting conservatism reduces information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, thus 
playing a strong governing role in the monitoring of managerial performance and leading to more profitable 
acquisitions. Chang et al. (2009) show that firms with better financial reporting have more flexibility to issue capital. 
High-quality financial reporting reduces adverse selection costs, which is associated with investment efficiency and 
reduced external financing costs. In addition, the likelihood that a firm will obtain excess funds because of 
temporary mispricing is also reduced. In sum, prior studies provide evidence that high-quality financial reporting 
increases shareholder ability to monitor managerial investment activities, thereby enhancing investment efficiency. 
 
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
 
In this study, we investigate the relationship between financial reporting quality and investment efficiency, 
focusing on acquisition. We predict that the relationship between financial reporting quality and investment decision 
profitability is salient in the context of acquisitions under conditions of information asymmetry between managers 
and outside suppliers of capital for the following reasons. 
 
First, acquisitions are among the largest and most readily observable forms of corporate investment. Second, 
investment in the form of acquisition tends to intensify agency conflicts between managers and shareholders in 
public companies (Berle and Means, 1933; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Jensen (1986) and Blanchard et al. (1994) 
document that managers pursue perquisite consumption and empire building rather than making excess payouts to 
shareholders by making value-decreasing acquisitions. Morck et al. (1990) suggest that acquisition can provide 
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personal benefits to managers such as enabling managers to diversify the risk of their own human capital, and 
improving their job security at the expense of the market value of the firm. Finally, measurement of acquisition 
profitability offers minimal measurement error compared to that of investment efficiency, which is generally used as 
a measure in prior studies. In these studies, a model
3
 is estimated that predicts optimal investment levels and then 
uses residuals from this model as a proxy for inefficiency. Investment inefficiency is investment that exceeds or 
lacks the optimal (or expected) level given a firm's investment opportunities. The measurement error caused by 
assumptions in this model can be used to determine optimal investment size. However, use of acquisition investment 
profitability as a measure results in fewer measurement errors because market returns which are more reliable are 
used. 
 
As such, considering the importance of acquisition and the monitoring role of financial reporting quality on 
management investment decision-making, we expect high-quality financial reporting to be positively associated with 
a bidder’s expected profitability as a result of the acquisition. The first hypothesis is therefore as follows. 
 
H1: High-quality financial reporting is positively associated with acquisition profitability. 
 
Francis and Martin (2010) find that the positive relationship between timely loss recognition and 
acquisition profitability is more pronounced for firms with high ex ante agency costs. The evidence of their study 
suggests that since it is costly for outsiders to evaluate management investment decisions and overall firm 
performance for firms under conditions of greater information asymmetry (Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 
1993; LaFond and Watts, 2008), financial reporting is an important source of information that allows investors to 
monitor managers’ acquisition investment decisions. 
 
However, the relative importance of financial reporting quality in monitoring acquisition investment 
decision-making may vary depending on the other sources of information about a firm. Such information may also 
be obtained from financial analysts. Financial analysts play an integral role as information intermediaries, monitors 
of corporate performance, and economic agents whose actions affect investors’ behavior. Analyst coverage is an 
important part of a firm's information environment; among other benefits, it may lead to greater investor recognition 
of a firm (Merton, 1987). Due to the importance of analyst coverage in the information environment, many studies 
have identified a variety of benefits of analyst coverage, including reduced information asymmetry and increased 
liquidity (e.g., O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Frankel and Li, 2004). In addition, the role 
of analysts in financial markets suggests that they are likely to have a positive influence on firm value by restricting 
activities of managers that are not geared toward maximizing value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
As analysts’ activities reduce information asymmetry between managers and outside investors, firms with 
an analyst following are regarded as having better information environments. Therefore, investors in firms with a 
                                           
3
 Traditionally, Tobin's Q model or the modified version of McNichols and Stubben (2008) is used for measurement of investment 
efficiency in prior studies, as below. 
(1) Tobin's Q model 
INVt = α0 + β1Qt-1 + β2CFOt + εt 
where: 
INV = Capital expenditures 
 = Cash outflow from investing activities/Net property, plant, and equipment 
Q = Tobin's Q 
 = (market value of equity + total liabilities)/Book value of total assets 
CFO = Cash flow from operations/Net property, plant, and equipment 
(2) modified version of McNichols and Stubben (2008) 
INVt = α0 + β1Qt-1 + β2Q_QRT2t-1 + β3Q_QRT3t-1 + β4Q_QRT4t-1 + β5CFOt + β6GROWTHt + β7INVt-1 + εt 
Where: 
INV = Capital expenditures 
 = Cash outflow from investing activities/Net property, plant, and equipment 
Q_QRT2 (Q_QRT3, Q_QTR4) = Tobin's Q*, an indicator variable to partition Tobin's Q into quartiles (1 if Q belongs to the second 
(third, fourth) quartile of its industry-year distribution, and 0 otherwise) 
CFO = Cash flow from operations/Net property, plant, and equipment 
Growth = In(total assets/ total assets at the beginning of the year) 
Growth = In(total assets/ total assets at the beginning of the year) 
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good analyst following may depend relatively less on financial reporting quality for information. However, 
shareholders of firms with no analyst following may depend more on financial reporting. Financial reporting quality 
is thus likely to play an even more important role in reducing managers' incentives to make unprofitable acquisition 
investment decisions in such firms. This argument leads to the second hypothesis. 
 
H2: The relative importance of financial reporting quality depends on the characteristics of the information 
environment. 
 
3. SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Sample Description 
 
Our acquisition sample is extracted from the S&P Capital IQ database. In total, 282 acquisitions made by 
150 firms that meet the following criteria are identified between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2011: 
 
1. The headquarters of the acquiring company is in South Korea. 
2. The acquiring company is listed on the Korea Stock Exchange. 
3. The acquiring company is not a financial institution. 
4. The acquisition is completed at the time of the study. 
5. Information about the annual financial statement of the acquiring company is available from the KIS-
VALUE database. 
6. Information about the stock return data of the acquiring company is available from the Fn-Guide Database. 
 
Table 1:  Sample Distribution 
Panel A:  Sample Distribution by Announcement Year 
Year 
Number of 
Acquisitions 
Percentage of 
Sample 
Median Acquirer Market Value 
of Equity (KRW million) 
Median Deal Value 
(KRW million) 
Median Relative 
Size 
2001 1 0.34 11,417,917 15,210 0.13% 
2002 3 1.03 11,681,800 53,290 5.87% 
2003 5 1.72 155,132 5,800 2.19% 
2004 6 2.06 8,285,440 53,870 8.50% 
2005 17 5.84 1,768,750 17,830 4.06% 
2006 27 10.31 1,013,540 21,975 3.86% 
2007 39 14.78 695,939 11,050 2.90% 
2008 57 20.27 209,423 10,700 6.95% 
2009 33 11.34 4,544,900 66,170 4.21% 
2010 42 14.43 4,923,870 61,245 1.83% 
2011 52 17.87 1,422,660 8,585 1.57% 
Total 282 100.00 1,341,490 15,210 3.13% 
Panel B:  Sample Distribution by Industry 
Industry Name Number of Acquisitions Percentage of Sample 
Food 12 4.26% 
Textile & Fabric 3 1.06% 
Pulp & Paper 4 1.42% 
Chemicals 39 13.83% 
Non-Metallic Mineral 5 1.77% 
Metal 25 8.87% 
Transport Equipment 70 24.82% 
Electrical Machinery 4 1.42% 
General Construction 12 4.26% 
Transport 28 9.93% 
Service 80 28.37% 
Total 282 100.00% 
 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the acquisition sample by announcement year. Panel A shows a 
general increase in the number of acquisitions until 2008, sharp decreases in 2009, and increases again after 2010. 
Panel A also reports the annual median bidder market value of equity (measured at the end of the fiscal year before 
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acquisition), the value of the deal, and the relative size of the deal (defined as the ratio of the value of the deal to the 
bidder's market value of equity). The median bidder market value is 1,341,490 million Korean won, the median deal 
value is 15,210 million won, and the median relative deal size is 0.0313. Panel B provides the industry classification 
of the bidders in the sample. The most frequent bidders are from service industries (n = 80, 28.37%), followed by 
those in the transport equipment industry (n = 70, 24.82%) and the chemical industry (n = 39, 13.83%). 
 
3.2 Measure of Financial Reporting Quality 
 
We use a measure of accruals quality as a proxy for financial reporting quality according to the method of 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) (hereafter DD) and McNichols (2002). This measure is based on the idea that accruals 
are adjusted according to the expectation of future cash flows. Therefore, adjusted earnings provide a good measure 
of firm performance. In the DD model, accruals quality is measured by the extent to which working capital accruals 
map into operating cash flow realization. DD argue that the quality of accruals and earnings depends on the 
magnitude of error in estimation of accruals because accruals require assumptions and estimates of future cash flows. 
As such, DD derive an empirical model of accruals quality as the residuals from regressions of changes in working 
capital on past, present, and future operating cash flows, as described in Equation (1). The residuals from the 
regression reflect accruals that are unrelated to cash flow realization. 
 
McNichols (2002) suggests an extension to the model of DD. She finds that the implications of both the 
DD model and the Jones model (1991) necessitate development of more powerful approaches to the estimation of 
earnings quality and the role of management discretion in influencing earnings quality. As such, McNichols (2002) 
suggests a link between the DD model and the Jones model, as described in Equation (2). 
 
DD derive practical measures of accruals quality at the firm-year level in two ways. First of all, DD use the 
standard deviation of the residuals of firm-level time-series regression as a firm-specific measure of accruals quality, 
where a higher standard deviation denotes lower quality. However, as Francis et al. (2005) observe, this method has 
one weakness. If a firm has consistently large residuals resulting in low standard deviations, that firm may seem to 
have relatively good accruals quality because uncertainty about its accruals is low, even if in reality, the accruals 
map poorly into cash flows. Thus, DD develop an alternative measure of accruals quality at the firm-year level using 
the absolute value of the residuals
4
 for that year, which is estimated cross-sectionally. We use this alternative 
measure in this study. We estimate the model in Equations (1) and (2) cross-sectionally for each industry with at 
least 10 observations in a given year based on each firm’s KIS-VALUE industry middle-classification. 
 
We multiply absolute residuals from Equations (1) and (2) by −1 so that this variable increases as financial 
reporting quality increases, as described in Equation (3). All variables are scaled by total assets. 
 
ΔWCi,t = β0 + β1CashFlowi,t-1 + β2CashFlowi,t + β3CashFlowi,t+1 + εi,t (1) 
 
ΔWCi,t = β0 + β1CashFlowi,t-1 + β2CashFlowi,t + β3CashFlowi,t+1 + β4ΔSalesi,t + β5PPEi,t + εi,t (2) 
 
where: 
 
ΔWC = (ΔCA – ΔCash) – (ΔCL – ΔSTD) 
ΔCA = Change in current assets 
ΔCash = Change in cash and cash equivalents 
ΔCL = Change in current liabilities 
ΔSTD = Change in short – term debt 
CashFlow = cash from operations from the statement of cash flow 
ΔSales = change in sales 
PPE = Gross property, plant and equipment 
 
 
                                           
4
 This measure is highly correlated with the standard deviation of the residuals of time-series regression. 
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AQi,t = (-1) * | εi,t | (3) 
 
where: 
 
AQ = Accruals quality 
ε = residual from Equation (1) or Equation (2) 
 
3.3 Measure of Expected Acquisition Profitability 
 
We measure acquisition profitability by market-adjusted stock returns of bidders around the time of initial 
announcement of an acquisition, since the market reaction around this time captures both the ex ante investment 
selection and the expected value of ex post decision-making. Announcement dates are obtained from the S&P 
Capital IQ database. We compute an acquirer's 3-day cumulative abnormal return (AcqCAR) centered on the 
acquisition announcement date. The KOSPI value-weighted return
5
 is used for market return. 
 
3.4 Empirical Models 
 
We examine the association between high-quality financial reporting and acquisition profitability in our 
testing of hypothesis 1. As such, we test H1 with additional firm acquisition-level controls in the following model: 
 
AcqCARi,t = β1 + β2AQi,t-1 + β3Sizei,t + β4Leveragei,t + β5TobinQi,t + β6Lossi,t + β7RelativeSizei,t +  
β8Stockdeali,t β9Interesti,t + β10Chaeboli,t + YearDummy + IndustryDummy + εi,t (4) 
 
The dependent variable, acquisition profitability (AcqCAR), is examined using 3-day CAR around the time 
of initial acquisition announcement. The independent variable, accruals quality (AQ), is used as a proxy for financial 
reporting quality in its form from both the DD model (hereafter AQ1) and the model suggested by McNichols (2002) 
(hereafter AQ2), as discussed in section 3.2. 
 
We consider four control variables for bidder characteristics, three control variables for deal characteristics, 
one control variable for the unique aspects of Korean corporate governance, and year and industry controls, which 
are related to acquirer returns in Equation (4). Bidder traits, including firm size (Size), leverage (Leverage), Tobin's 
q (TobinQ), and past firm performance (Loss) are also controlled. Deal characteristics including relative deal value 
(RelativeSize), method of payment (Stockdeal), and ownership due to acquisition (Interest) are also controlled. 
Finally, we control for the unique Korean form of corporate governance known as the Chaebol (Chaebol), which 
identifies the bidder as a member or nonmember of a Korean business group. 
 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find a negative correlation between bidder size and the bidder's 
CAR during the announcement period. They find that on average, larger acquirers pay higher premiums and make 
acquisitions that generate negative synergies. This finding supports the managerial hubris hypothesis (Roll, 1986). 
Also, since larger firms have more effective takeover mechanisms, managers of large firms are more entrenched and 
more likely to make value-decreasing acquisitions. In our test, we define firm size as the log transformation of the 
bidder's total assets. 
 
Leverage is an important governance mechanism, since creditors have significant control over managers 
and power to limit managerial discretion. Leverage also provides incentives for managers to improve firm 
performance, because if their firms fall into financial distress, they may lose their jobs. As such, we control for 
leverage in the model, measuring it as total liability divided by total equity. 
 
Prior studies find that the Tobin's q value of an acquirer has an ambiguous effect on CAR. Lang, Stulz, and 
Walking (1991) and Servas (1991) document a positive association between Tobin's q and tender offer acquisitions 
and public firm acquisitions, respectively, while Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find a negative 
association in a comprehensive sample of acquisitions. We define Tobin's q as the ratio of a bidder's market value of 
                                           
5
 Using equally-weighted return as market return has same results. 
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assets over its book value of assets, where market value of assets is computed as the book value of assets minus the 
book value of common equity plus the market value of common equity. 
 
According to Lakonishok and Shleifer Vishny (1994) and Hayward and Hambrick (1995), past firm 
performance influences acquisition decision-making, especially for managers of firms with poor performance, who 
must be prudent with their investments. As such, we control for past performance by including a dummy variable 
coded as 1 if the bidder's net income is < 0, and 0 otherwise. 
 
We also control for relative deal size. Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) find that bidder announcement 
returns increase relative to deal size, and the reverse is also true for the subsample of large bidders in Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004). We measure relative deal size as the deal value divided by the bidder's market 
value measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement of acquisitions. We also consider the method of 
payment as a control variable. According to Servaea (1991) and Brown and Ryngaert (1991), bidders experience 
significantly negative abnormal returns on the announcement date when they pay for acquisitions with equity, but 
not when they pay with cash. In order to capture the effects of the deal payment method, we include an indicator 
variable denoted by stock deal, where stock deal = 1 for acquisitions financed either partially or fully with stock, and 
0 otherwise. As the acquirer's ownership after acquisition has an effect on investment profitability (Park and Lee, 
2006; Jung and Park, 2006), we also control for ownership ratio after the deal. 
 
Additionally, we control for the unique form of Korean corporate governance called the Chaebol (or 
business group). Jung et al. (2002) and An et al. (2002) state that majority shareholders have sufficient ownership 
and rights to govern management decisions in Korea. Chaebol is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the bidder belongs 
to a business group, and 0 otherwise. Finally, we include year and industry dummies in the regression model as 
control variables. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A of Table 2 lists descriptive statistics for the full sample. The mean (median) 3-day bidder CAR 
(AcqCAR) is 1.48% (0.77%), which is slightly higher than the mean of 1.2% and median of 0.4% reported in 
Francis and Martin (2010). The mean and median values for accruals quality (AQ1) during the year before 
acquisition are −0.0739 and −0.041, respectively. These statistics are higher than the mean of −0.107 and median of 
−0.077 reported in Kim et al. (2010). This means that firms that make investments in the form of acquisitions have 
higher-quality reporting on average than firms that do not. Values for the other measure of accruals quality, AQ2, are 
similar to those for AQ1. The leverage for the average (median) acquirer in our sample is 1.1754 (0.9365). The 
Tobin's q for the average (median) acquirer in our sample is 1.3273 (1.1450). The mean of Loss is 0.1454, which 
shows that for 14.54% of the bidders, net income is < 0. The relative deal size (the deal value scaled by the bidder's 
market value) for the average (median) acquirer in our sample is 0.1419 (0.0266), which shows that 14.19% of the 
equity value of the bidders is used to pay for the deal on average. The mean value for the stock deal dummy is 
0.1206, indicating that 12.06% of the payments made for acquisition in this sample are financed either partially or 
fully with stock. The mean of Interest is 0.5113, which shows that the bidder acquires 51.03% interest in the target's 
shares after acquisition on average. The mean of the Chaebol dummy is 0.6560, indicating that 65.60% of the 
acquirers belong to a Korean business group. 
 
Panel B shows descriptive statistics only for firms with analyst followings. In this sample, 171 acquisition-
firm observations are included. In addition, for 111 acquisition-firm observations, the firms have no analyst 
following. These are reported in Panel C. Financial reporting quality is higher for firms with analyst following than 
firms with no analyst following, as indicated by the mean (median) of AQ1 of −0.0523 (−0.0344) and the mean 
(median) of AQ2 of −0.0541 (−0.0364) for firms with analyst following, and the mean (median) of AQ1 of −0.1071 
(−0.0611) and the mean (median) of AQ2 of −0.0990 (−0.0587) for firms with no analyst following. Firms with 
analyst following are larger in size than firms with no analyst following on average, as indicated by the mean of the 
log transformation of the bidder's total assets for firms with analyst following of 29.0244, and that for firms with no 
analyst following of 26.9103. Bidders with no analyst following (mean loss: 30.63%) lost more net income than 
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bidders with analyst following (mean loss: 4.09%) on average. Firms with no analyst following make bigger 
acquisition investments relative to their equity value than firms with analyst following, as indicated by the mean 
(median) of RelativeSize for firms with no analyst following of 0.1905 (0.0606) and the mean (median) of 
RelativeSize for firms with analyst following of 0.1104 (0.0148). In addition, for 16.96% of the sample of acquiring 
firms with analyst following, the acquisitions are financed either partially or fully with stock, but this is true for only 
4.51% of the sample of acquiring firms with no analyst following. Finally, firms with analyst following belong to a 
Korean business group (Chaebol) more often than firms with no analyst following (80.70% vs. 42.34%). 
 
Table 2:  Summary Statistics 
Panel A:  Full Sample 
Variable N Mean StdDev Minimum Median Maximum 
AcqCAR(VWI) 282 0.0148 0.0671 −0.2811 0.0077 0.4375 
AQ1 282 −0.0739 0.0977 −0.7007 −0.0411 −0.0004 
AQ2 282 −0.0718 0.0913 −0.6244 −0.0426 −0.0003 
Size 282 28.1923 2.1318 24.0235 28.3559 32.3971 
Leverage 282 1.1754 1.2139 0.0354 0.9365 10.2233 
TobinQ 282 1.3273 0.9168 0.4803 1.1450 6.5566 
Loss 282 0.1454 0.3531 0.0000 0 1.0000 
RelativeSize 282 0.1419 0.3269 0.0000 0.0266 1.9542 
Stock deal 282 0.1206 0.3262 0.0000 0 1.0000 
Interest 282 0.5113 0.3483 0.0115 0.4900 1.0000 
Chaebol 282 0.6560 0.4759 0.0000 1 1.0000 
AcqCAR is 3-day market adjusted cumulative stock returns of bidders around the time of initial acquisition announcement (−1, +1). AQ1 
is financial reporting quality measured by Dechow and Dichev (2002). AQ2 is financial reporting quality measured by McNichols (2002). 
Size is the natural logarithm of assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. Leverage is the book value of debt scaled by the total book value 
of equity. TobinQ is the ratio of a bidder's market value of assets over its book value of assets, where market value of assets is computed 
as the book value of assets minus the book value of common equity plus the market value of common equity. Loss is a dummy variable 
coded as 1 if the bidder has net income below 0, and 0 otherwise. RelativeSize is equal to deal value divided by bidder's market value 
measured at the fiscal year-end prior to acquisition announcement. Stock deal is a dummy variable coded as 1 if acquisitions are financed 
either partially or fully by stock, and 0 otherwise. Interest is the bidder's interest of the target's shares of the acquisition. Chaebol is a 
dummy variable coded as 1 if the bidder belongs to a business group, and 0 otherwise. 
Panel B:  Firms with Analyst Followings 
Variable N Mean StdDev Minimum Median Maximum 
AcqCAR 171 0.0109 0.0516 −0.1126 0.0066 0.1974 
AQ1 171 −0.0523 0.0602 −0.4690 −0.0344 −0.0008 
AQ2 171 −0.0541 0.0607 −0.4791 −0.0364 −0.0009 
Size 171 29.0244 1.6413 24.9051 29.0825 32.3055 
Leverage 171 1.1800 1.2634 0.1859 0.8651 10.2233 
TobinQ 171 1.4950 1.0996 0.4803 1.1951 6.5566 
Loss 171 0.0409 0.1987 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
RelativeSize 171 0.1104 0.2990 0.0001 0.0148 1.9542 
Stock deal 171 0.1696 0.3764 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Interest 171 0.5350 0.3520 0.0115 0.5000 1.0000 
Chaebol 171 0.8070 0.3958 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
This table presents descriptive statistics only for the firms with analyst following. All variables are defined in Panel A of Table 2. 
Panel C:  Firms without Analyst Followings 
Variable N Mean StdDev Minimum Median Maximum 
AcqCAR 111 0.0208 0.0855 −0.2811 0.0092 0.4375 
AQ1 111 −0.1071 0.1301 −0.7007 −0.0611 −0.0004 
AQ2 111 −0.0990 0.1199 −0.6244 −0.0587 −0.0003 
Size 111 26.9103 2.1705 24.0235 26.3585 32.3971 
Leverage 111 1.1685 1.1389 0.0354 0.9868 8.3687 
TobinQ 111 1.0690 0.4093 0.4803 0.9767 2.7359 
Loss 111 0.3063 0.4631 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
RelativeSize 111 0.1905 0.3619 0.0000 0.0606 1.9542 
Stock deal 111 0.0451 0.2083 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
Interest 111 0.4748 0.3411 0.0115 0.4496 1.0000 
Chaebol 111 0.4234 0.4963 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
This table presents descriptive statistics only for the firms with no analyst following. All variables are defined in Panel A of Table 2. 
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Table 3 presents Pearson correlations. The market perceives acquisitions to be more profitable when 
bidders have higher leverage, less loss of income, higher-value deals, and deals that are financed partially or fully 
with stock. A positive relationship is evident between financial reporting quality (AQ1 and AQ2) and firm size 
(Size), and between financial reporting quality and membership in a Korean business group (Chaebol). However, a 
negative relationship is evident between financial reporting quality and Leverage, Loss, and RelativeSize. 
 
Table 3:  Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
AQ1 AQ2 SIZE Leverage TobinQ Loss 
Relative 
Size 
Stockdeal Interest Chaebol 
AcqCAR 0.040 0.033 −0.095 0.155** −0.024 0.141** 0.113* 0.109* 0.041 −0.041 
AQ1  0.945*** 0.511*** −0.103* 0.052 −0.392*** −0.145** −0.004 −0.046 0.399*** 
AQ2   0.500*** −0.126** 0.013 −0.350*** −0.111* −0.028 −0.0709 0.395*** 
SIZE    0.025 0.007 −0.474*** −0.258*** −0.017 −0.245*** 0.772*** 
Leverage     −0.040 0.122** 0.131** 0.009 −0.107* 0.149** 
TobinQ      −0.068 −0.132** −0.036 0.206*** −0.030 
Loss       0.089 −0.029 0.092 −0.421*** 
Relative 
Size 
       0.129** 0.082 −0.106* 
Stockdeal         0.2271*** −0.0299 
Interest          −0.2305*** 
All variables are defined in Panel A of Table 2. 
 
4.2 Main Results 
 
Table 4 reports the results of the multivariate test of the hypotheses based on the estimation in Equation (4). 
Columns 2 and 3 present the regression results using accruals quality from the DD model (AQ1) as the independent 
variable, and Columns 4 and 5 report the results using the independent variable from the McNichols model (AQ2). 
As predicted in hypothesis 1, the results show that the coefficients of both AQ1 and AQ2 on AcqCAR are positive 
and significant at the 10% level. These results suggest that firms with high-quality financial reporting make more 
profitable acquisitions based on ex ante perceptions. In addition, as financial reporting quality plays a monitoring 
role in the management of acquisition investment, high-quality financial reporting leads to acquisition efficiency. 
With respect to the control variables, only the coefficients for AcqCAR of leverage and Loss are positive and 
statistically significant when AQ1 is used as the independent variable. 
 
Table 4:  OLS Regression Analysis of the Association between Bidder  
Announcement Returns and Financial Reporting Quality 
AcqCARi,t = β1 + β2AQi,t-1 + β3Sizei,t + β4Leveragei,t + β5TobinQi,t + β6Lossi,t + β7RelativeSizei,t + β8Stockdeali,t + β9Interesti,t + 
β10Chaeboli,t + YearDummy + IndustryDummy + εi,t 
Variable 
Independent Variable:  AQ1 Independent Variable:  AQ2 
Coeff. t Value Coeff. t Value 
Intercept 0.034 0.35 0.030 0.31 
AQ 0.090 1.83* 0.092 1.75* 
Size −0.002 −0.56 −0.002 −0.52 
Leverage 0.005 1.44* 0.006 1.51 
TobinQ 0.002 0.35 0.002 0.43 
Loss 0.031 2.29** 0.029 2.19 
RelativeSize 0.012 0.93 0.011 0.84 
Stock deal 0.018 1.47 0.019 1.52 
Interest −0.007 −0.52 −0.006 −0.48 
Chaebol 0.009 0.62 0.009 0.61 
Year dummy Include Include 
Industry dummy Include Include 
N 282 282 
Adj-R2(%) 11.07% 10.98% 
All variables are defined in Panel A of Table 2. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% 
level. 
 
Hypothesis 2 posits a weaker positive association between financial reporting quality and acquisition 
efficiency in good information environments or for firms with good analyst following. In other words, the effect of 
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financial reporting on acquisition efficiency is more important in low-quality information environments. Table 5 
presents the results of testing of Hypothesis 2. Panel A presents the association between bidder returns and financial 
reporting quality for firms with analyst following. In this sample, financial reporting quality is unrelated to 
acquisition profitability. However, Panel B shows a positive association between financial reporting quality and 
acquisition efficiency for firms with no analyst following. The coefficient of AQ1 is positive and significant at the 1% 
level, and the coefficient of AQ2 is also positive and significant at the 10% level. This result is consistent with our 
prediction, and suggests that financial reporting quality is more important to the control of management acquisition 
decision-making in poor information environments. In addition, financial reporting quality and existing information 
environment are substitutes in terms of the association with acquisition investment efficiency. 
 
Table 5:  Analyst Following and the Association of Bidder Returns and Financial Reporting Quality 
AcqCARi,t = β1 + β2AQi,t-1 + β3Sizei,t + β4Leveragei,t + β5TobinQi,t + β6Lossi,t + β7RelativeSizei,t + β8Stockdeali,t + β9Interesti,t + 
β10Chaeboli,t + YearDummy + IndustryDummy + εi,t 
Panel A:  Firms with Analyst Following 
Variable 
Independent Variable:  AQ1 Independent Variable:  AQ2 
Coeff. t Value Coeff. t Value 
Intercept 0.026 0.19 0.032 0.24 
AQ −0.071 −0.90 −0.057 −0.73 
Size −0.002 −0.38 −0.002 −0.41 
Leverage 0.000 0.08 0.000 0.10 
TobinQ 0.005 1.18 0.005 1.11 
Loss 0.032 1.51 0.033 1.55 
RelativeSize 0.003 0.18 0.003 0.21 
Stock deal 0.011 0.87 0.010 0.83 
Interest −0.013 −0.97 −0.013 −0.96 
Chaebol 0.019 1.10 0.018 1.06 
Year dummy Include Include 
Industry dummy Include Include 
N 171 171 
Adj-R2(%) 0.01% 0.02% 
All variables are defined in Panel A of Table 2. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel B:  Firms without Analyst Following 
Variable 
Independent Variable:  AQ1 Independent Variable:  AQ2 
Coeff. t Value Coeff. t Value 
Intercept 0.034 0.19 0.005 0.03 
AQ 0.203 2.67*** 0.184 2.22* 
Size −0.001 −0.18 0.000 −0.04 
Leverage −0.008 −0.94 −0.007 −0.75 
TobinQ 0.012 0.56 0.011 0.52 
Loss 0.027 1.22 0.023 1.04 
RelativeSize −0.011 −0.40 −0.013 −0.46 
Stock deal 0.077 1.91* 0.078 1.89** 
Interest −0.006 −0.25 −0.003 −0.10 
Chaebol 0.000 0.00 −0.002 −0.09 
Year dummy include Include 
Industry dummy include Include 
N 111 111 
Adj-R2(%) 21.96% 30.27% 
All variables are defined in Panel A of Table 2. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Overall, the results in Tables 4 and 5 support H1 and H2. Thus, because financial reporting quality plays a 
monitoring role in management acquisition investment, higher-quality financial reporting leads to greater acquisition 
efficiency. In addition, since elements of the information environment, such as financial analyst following, could be 
substitutes of financial reporting, the positive association between high-quality financial reporting and acquisition 
profitability is weakened for firms in good information environments. This provides further support for the assertion 
that financial reporting quality is more important for firms in poor information environments. 
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, we investigate the association between financial reporting quality and firm decision-making 
regarding investment in the form of acquisition. We find that firms with higher-quality accounting make more 
profitable acquisitions, as evidenced by ex ante market perceptions (larger announcement returns measured by 3-day 
CAR). Our results suggest that firms with higher-quality accounting are less likely to make myopic acquisition 
investment decisions. For these firms, financial accounting reporting quality acts as an effective monitoring 
mechanism to control managers' opportunistic behavior when making acquisition investment decisions. We also find 
that the association between financial reporting quality and acquisition profitability is more salient for firms with 
poor information environments and no analyst following. The results of the analysis show that the effect of financial 
reporting quality on acquisition profitability is more important for firms in poor information environments. This 
result suggests that financial reporting quality and information environment have similar effects on acquisition 
investment efficiency. 
 
Overall, the evidence provided in this study is consistent with the findings in extant accounting literature, 
which shows that financial reporting quality is a useful monitoring tool for firms to address agency problems and 
improve the efficiency of their acquisition investments. 
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